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Abstract
This Article examines the preliminary ruling procedure, by far the most important procedure
for legal practitioners and courts. Because Community law, by reason of its supremacy and direct
effect, impacts relationships between individuals, Member State courts are asking the Court to
decide Community law questions more frequently. Although the law to be applied in these cases
is the same in all Member States, there is a potential danger to the functioning of the EC legal
system as a whole if the law is not applied uniformly in the Member States. The founding fathers
of the Community averted this situation by conferring upon the Court of Justice a monopoly of
interpretation on questions of Community law.
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PRELIMINARY RULING PROCEDURE
INTRODUCTION
Under the founding treaties of the European Communi-
ties,' the Court of Justice (the "Court") was entrusted with the
task of ensuring observance of the law through its interpretation
and application of the three constitutive treaties.2 Under the in-
stitutional structure of the European Community ("EC" or
"Community") legal system, the Court has been given a monop-
oly of interpretation. The Court under Article 173 of the EC
Treaty may be called upon by any Member State, the Council, or
the Commission to review the legality of Community acts.3 All
natural and legal persons who are directly and individually af-
fected by such acts are also entitled to bring an action for annul-
ment.4
Because Community law, by reason of its supremacy and di-
rect effect, impacts relationships between individuals, Member
State courts are asking the Court to decide Community law ques-
tions more frequently. Although the law to be applied in these
cases is the same in all Member States, there is a potential dan-
ger to the functioning of the EC legal system as a whole if the law
is not applied uniformly in the Member States. The founding
fathers of the Community averted this situation by conferring
upon the Court ofJustice a monopoly of interpretation on questions
of Community law. This transfer of competence would have
been incomplete if Member State courts were not permitted to
refer disputes arising under Community law to the Court ofJus-
1. Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, Mar. 25, 1957,
298 U.N.T.S. 167, as amended in TPEsAS ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
(EC Off'l Pub. Off. 1987) [hereinafter EAEC Treaty]; Treaty Establishing the European
Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140, as amended in TRFAEES
ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (EC Off'l Pub. Off. 1987) [hereinafter
ECSC Treaty]; Treaty Establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, [1992] 1
C.M.L.R- 573 [hereinafter EC Treaty], incorporating changes made by Treaty on European
Union, Feb. 7 1992, O.J. C 224/01 (1992), [1992) 1 C.M.L.R. 719, 31 I.L.M. 247 (1992)
[hereinafter TEU]. The TEU, supra, amended the Treaty Establishing the European
Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S: No. 1 (Cmd.
51791) [hereinafter EEC Treaty], as amended by Single European Act, O.J. L 169/1
(1987), [1987) 2 C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinafter SEA], in TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EURO-
PEAN COMMUNrrEs (EC Off'l Pub. Off. 1987).
2. EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 164. "The Court ofJustice shall ensure that in the
interpretation and application of this Treaty the law is observed." Id.; EAEC Treaty,
supra note 1, art. 136; ECSC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 31.
3. EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 173, 1 2.
4. Id. art. 173, 4.
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tice. This Article examines the preliminary ruling procedure, by
far the most important procedure for legal practitioners and
courts.
I. CONTENT AND PURPOSE OF THE PRELIMvINARY
RULING PROCEDURE
In the preliminary ruling procedure, cooperation between
the courts of the Member States and the Court of'Justice in the
interpretation of Community law is enshrined in the EC Treaty
("Treaty"). This is a key concept of the Treaty, because apart
from a few exceptions, most notably competition law, the en-
forcement of Community law is a matter for the authorities and
courts of the Member States. Therefore, Member States are pri-
marily responsible for the application of Community law.
A. Interpretation of the EC Treaty
The preliminary reference procedure fosters cooperation
between the courts of the Member States and the Court of Jus-
tice.5 Article 177 of the EC Treaty states that the Court ofJustice
is to have 'jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning:
(a) the interpretation of this Treaty; (b) the validity and inter-
pretation of acts of the institutions of the Community and of the
ECB; (c) the interpretation of the statutes of bodies established
by an act of the Council, where those statutes so provide."6
Thus, the subject matter of preliminary references consists of the
entire area of Community law, including the founding treaties,
general principles of law, and so-called secondary legislation
passed by EC institutions.
When deciding a case, a national court may refer questions
on the interpretation and validity of Community law to the
Court of Justice for a binding determination. If a question of
Community law needs to be answered in order to determine a
case before a court of last instance, that court is obliged to submit
a reference for a preliminary ruling.' The establishment of the
5. The European court system is two-tiered, consisting of the Court of Justice of
the European Communities and below it the Court of First Instance. The Court of
Justice, the senior of the two courts, has a broaderjurisdiction and is solely responsible
for giving preliminary rulings on questions referred by the Member State courts.
6. EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 177, 1.
7. Id. art. 177, 13 . "Where any such question is raised in a case pending before a
court or tribunal of a member-State against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy
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preliminary ruling procedure gives a far-reaching guarantee that
Community law will remain uniform in all Member States.
A centralized court is particularly necessary because broad
areas of the Community legal order are decentralized. Commu-
nity legal provisions adopted by the Council and the Commis-
sion are usually applied by the authorities of Member States.
The Common Customs Tariff and the various individual customs
regulations, for example, are applied by the customs authorities
of the individual Member States. The regulations for imple-
menting the Community's agricultural policy are put into effect
by the authorities and intervention agencies of the Member
States. Furthermore, in the area of the freedom of movement
for workers, the provisions of Regulation No. 1408/71 of .the
Council on the application of social security systems to employed
persons moving within the Community8 are frequently the sub-
ject of references for preliminary rulings.
Individual citizens of the European Union9 are often af-
fected by administrative acts passed by Member State authorities
on the basis of Community law. The individual may defend
against such administrative acts only before the national courts.
If a question arises regarding the application and interpretation
of the provisions of Community law,10 the national court can stay
the proceedings and refer the matter to the Court ofJustice for a
decision. The importance of preserving the uniformity of the
EC legal order, which the preliminary reference procedure is
designed to uphold, has been expressly emphasized by the Court
of Justice on many occasions.'
under national law, that court or tribunal shall bring the matter before the Court of
Justice." Id.
8. Regulation No. 1408/71, O.J. L 149/2 (1971). This regulation, which lays down
binding provisions in welfare law, is applied by insurance institutions and social security
courts in the Member States and is therefore frequently referred to the Court for pre-
liminary rulings.
9. EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 8. "Every person holding the nationality of a mem-
ber-State shall be a citizen of the Union." Id.
10. Community law is contained in the three constitutive treaties, in the legal acts
of the institutions (i.e., regulations, directives, and decisions), in international agree-
ments concluded by the Community with non-Member States or external organizations,
and in certain general principles of law that the Court ofJustice has deduced from the
treaties and the legal systems of the Member States.
11. See, e.g., Rheinmfihlen-Dfisseldorf v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle ffir Getreide
und Futtermittel, Case 166/73, [1974] E.C.R 33, [1974] 1 C.M.L.R. 523; Foglia v.
Novello (II), Case 244/80, [1981] E.C.RL 3045, [1982] 1 C.M.L.R. 585; Firma C.
1994]
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B. ExclusiveJurisdiction to Declare Community Acts Invalid
The Court of Justice not only has jurisdiction to give bind-
ing interpretations on Community law, but also has exclusive juris-
diction to declare Community acts invalid. The annulment proce-
dure in Article 173 of the EC Treaty enables the Court to review
the legality of Community acts and set such acts aside.'" The
founding treaties, however, do not give an immediate indication
of whether Member State courts may review the validity of Com-
munity acts or decide not to apply Community law. While the
distribution of competence between the national courts and the
Court ofJustice suggests that the jurisdiction to declare Commu-
nity acts invalid rests exclusively with the Court of Justice, that
legal question long went unanswered both in Community legisla-
tion and in the Court's case law.
This question, however, was settled by the Court of Justice
in Firma Foto Frost v. Hauptzollamt Lfibeck-Ost, 13 decided on 22
October 1987. This case originated as a preliminary ruling ques-
tion raised by the Finanzgericht (Finance Court) of Hamburg.
In that judgment, the Court of Justice developed, inter alia, sev-
eral principles. First,
[national] courts may consider the validity of a Community
act and, if they consider that the grounds put forward before
them by the parties in support of invalidity are unfounded,
they may reject them, concluding that the measure is com-
pletely valid. By taking that action [the Member State courts]
are not calling ... the existence of the Community measure
in question. 14
In contrast, national courts do not have the power to declare acts
of the Community institutions invalid. 5
Article 177 [of the EC Treaty] is [designed] to ensure that
Community law is applied uniformly by national courts. That
requirement of uniformity is particularly imperative when the
validity of a Community act is in question. Divergences be-
tween courts in the member-States as to the validity of Com-
munity acts would be liable to place in jeopardy the very unity
Schwarze v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle ffir Getreide und Futtermittel, Case 16/65,
[1965] E.C.R. 877, [1966) C.M.L.R. 172.
12. EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 173, 1 1.
13. Case 314/85, [1987] E.C.R. 4199, [1988] 3 C.M.L.R. 57.
14. Id. at 4230, 1 14, [1988] 3 C.M.L.R. at 79.
15. Id. at 4231, 1 15, [1988] 3 C.M.L.R. at 79.
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of the Community legal order and detract from the funda-
mental requirements of legal certainty.
16
Because Article 173 gives the Court exclusive jurisdiction to de-
clare an act of a Community institution void, the coherence of
the system requires that the power to declare the act invalid
must also be reserved to the Court ofJustice.' 7 Finally, the Court
in Foto-Frost states that exceptions to the rule may be allowed in
the case of proceedings that relate to an application for interim
measures.'
8
C. Power and Duty to Refer
The only bodies that have the power to make a preliminary
reference to the Court of'Justice are courts and tribunals. 9 The
concept of a court or tribunal has a uniform definition under
Community law, which states that courts and tribunals are in-
dependent, permanent bodies, charged with the settlement of
disputes in accordance with the law and constituted on a statu-
tory basis. The jurisdiction in question must be compulsory.20
Problems of demarcation have arisen between judicial and
administrative procedures. In a purely administrative proceed-
ing, such as an objection made to a public authority concerning
an administrative act (Widerspruchsverfahren), a reference for a
preliminary ruling is not allowed. Even if a question of Commu-
nity law needs to be answered in order to determine such pro-
ceedings, the Court of Justice will not answer it. In such a case,
proceedings must be brought before an administrative court for
adjudication. Neither state authorities nor other bodies may
make a reference to the Court for a preliminary ruling, even if,
in some cases, it may appear desirable from the point of view of
procedural economy to do so.
By contrast, all courts and tribunals of the Member States
16. Id.
17. Id. at 4231, 1 17, [1988] 3 C.M.L.R. at 80.
18. Id. at 4232, 1 19, [1988] 3 C.M.L.R. at 80.
19. EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 177, 1 2. "Where such a question is raised before
any court or tribunal of a member-State, that court or tribunal may, if it considers that a
decision on the question is necessary to enable it to givejudgment, request the Court of
Justice to give a ruling thereon." Id.
20. See G. Vaassen v. Management of the Beambtenfonds voor het Mijnbedrijf,
Case 61/65, [1966] E.C.R. 261, [1966] C.M.L.R. 508.
1994]
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are entitled to make references, 21 so that a decision at the Euro-
pean level may take place even at first instance. The court or
tribunal decides independently whether to make a reference.
The parties do not need to bring their dispute before a higher
court in order to refer a question to the Court.
The duty to refer applies only to courts of last instance.22
Parties to the litigation, therefore, will sometimes have to lodge
appeals until a reference to the Court of Justice is made by the
Member State court. The parties are not able to compel a refer-
ence, as there is no formal remedy available to them. Under
existing law, the parties to the main proceedings in any given
case can do no more than urge the court, by implications and
suggestions, to make a reference.
A gap in legal protection arguably exists when a national
court does not share a party's conviction that a preliminary refer-
ence on a question of Community law is necessary to reach a
decision. Discussions on legal policy, primarily among practic-
ing lawyers, increasingly have focused on whether a right to
bring a matter before the Court of Justice should not be con-
ferred upon individuals on the grounds of effective legal protec-
tion. The Court has not yet reached the decision that this right
has been granted by Community law to the citizens of the Euro-
pean Union.
Nonetheless, failure to comply with the duty to refer is not
only detrimental to the Community's interest in the observance
of its legal order, but also constitutes an infringement of the in-
dividual legal protection accorded under Community law. In a
number of Member States, including Germany for example, it is
also an objective breach of internal (administrative) law. Unfor-
tunately, the only sanction is the setting aside of the decision if
the reference has been omitted deliberately.
It has not been determined which courts or tribunals are
under a duty to make a reference to the Court ofJustice. Article
177 refers to those courts or tribunals of individual states
"against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under na-
tional law."2" Under this formulation, there are two approaches
for looking at this situation. First, under the abstract (institu-
21. EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 177, 1 2.
22. Id. art. 177, 1 3; see supra note 7 (quoting text of Article 177, paragraph three).
23. EG Treaty, supra note 1, art. 177, 3.
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tional) theory, inspired by the notion of preserving the legal sys-
tem, only the highest courts are under a duty to refer.
The concrete (functional) approach, on the other hand,
states that all courts or tribunals are under a duty to make a ref-
erence when there is no remedy against their decisions. In so far
as the parties' ability to appeal is conditional on leave (i.e., an
appeal is only possible if the court allows the party to lodge an
appeal), the concrete approach provides the adequate solution.
It follows that, if an appeal exists as of right, there is no duty to
refer. If there is no right of appeal, courts of first instance and
intermediate courts may also be under a duty to refer.
The concrete theory is better geared toward giving compre-
hensive legal protection to the individual. The latter may be per-
manently disadvantaged when a judicial decision is no longer
subject to appeal. The Court ofJustice has not hitherto declared
whether it favors the abstract or the concrete theory, although
an obiter dictum in the judgment in Costa v. Ente Nazionale Per
L'Energia Elettrica24 suggests that the Court favors the concrete
approach. The overwhelming opinion in legal literature also fa-
vors the application of the concrete theory, and it is therefore
advisable in practice to proceed on that basis. As far as practice
is concerned, however, it is important to stress once again that
every court is entitled to make a reference to the Court of Justice
for a preliminary ruling. The conflict between the theories is
relevant only to the duty to refer.
II. CONTENT AND SCOPE OF THE DUTY TO REFER
When a court or tribunal that has a duty to refer under the
abstract or concrete theory is faced with a question of Commu-
nity law that it cannot answer, it is obliged in principle to refer
the matter to the Court of Justice. Under Article 177, a refer-
ence must be made unless the Court has recognized a reason for
not doing so. The Court of Justice discussed this issue in Srl
C.LL.F.L T. v. Ministry of Health,25 which originated as a reference
from the Corte Suprema di Cassazione (Supreme Court of Cassa-
tion) in Italy. The Court stated that a court or tribunal against
whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law is
24. Case 6/64, [1964] E.C.R. 585, [1964] C.M.L.R. 425.
25. Case 283/81, [1982] E.C.R. 3415, [1983] 1 C.M.L.R. 472.
1994]
396 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 18:388
required to bring questions of Community law before the Court,
unless the court or tribunal has established that
the question raised is irrelevant or that the Community provi-
sion in question has already been interpreted by the Court or
that the correct application of Community law is so obvious as
to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt. The existence of
such a possibility must be assessed in the light of the specific
characteristics of Community law, the particular difficulties to
which its interpretation gives rise and the risk of divergences
in judicial decisions within the Community.26
A. The Role of the National Court in the Preliminary
Ruling Procedure
It is the duty of the Member State courts to determine, in
accordance with their discretion, whether a question of Commu-
nity law needs to be answered in order to reach a decision. It is
for these courts to decide both whether a reference to the Court
of Justice is necessary and the timing of this reference. The
Court is not permitted to review the appropriateness of the ref-
erence. Nor, in principle, does the Court review the jurisdic-
tion or the observance of other national rules of procedure.
Even if an appeal is lodged against the reference for a prelimi-
nary ruling, the Court can only stay or discontinue the proceed-
ings if requested to do so.
Therefore, the Member State courts have broad discretion
except where the purpose of the preliminary ruling procedure is
at stake. The Court determines the limits of the Member State
courts when reviewing the purpose of the preliminary ruling
procedure.
An admissible reference for a preliminary ruling must fulfill
the following requirements. The national court must demon-
strate a question of Community law that is the proper subject of
a reference-i.e., it must concern a dispute to which Community
law is applicable. Questions on the interpretation of national
law or on how to reconcile national law with Community law are
not answered by the Court of Justice in the preliminary ruling
26. Id. at 3431, 21, [1983] 1 C.M.L.R. at 491.
27. But see Monin Automobiles - Maison du Deux-Roues, Case C-428/93, [1994]
E.C.R. 1-1707.
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procedure. In certain cases, however, the Court may reinterpret
the question.
In addition, there must be a genuine dispute, and not a pa-
tently manufactured case. The function of the Court of Justice
in the preliminary ruling procedure is not to give advisory opin-
ions. The Court, however, has rarely dismissed a reference for a
preliminary ruling for lack of a genuine dispute.2" In a few iso-
lated cases, the Court was unable to give a meaningful answer
due to insufficient factual and legal information.29
B. Failure to Comply With the Duty to Refer
Member State courts that are not courts of last instance de-
cide freely whether to refer a question to the Court. The parties
to a case may not compel or prevent a reference by a Member
State court to the Court ofJustice. If a Member State court fails
to make a reference, the parties concerned have no alternative
but to lodge an appeal on other grounds, and then propose a
reference in the higher court. If the motion to refer is unsuc-
cessful in the highest court, the parties have no recourse, even if
that court were under a legal obligation to refer to the Court of
Justice.
Incorrect application of the law by courts of last instance
may not be corrected. Criticism of the court's decision, how-
ever, is possible and justified. Nonetheless, the judgment is le-
gally binding. The determinations of the highest courts of the
Member States that erroneously apply the law are irrevocable
and accepted with disapproval by the legal system.
Consequently, the question arises whether infringements of
Community law by national courts of last instance warrant differ-
ent treatment. For instance, the Community could introduce a
form of review of such a judgment by another level of jurisdic-
tion. This possibility, however, represents a fundamental inter-
ference in the Member States' legal system. The decisions of
courts of last instance would no longer be final, but would be
subject to review by another jurisdiction.
Such an interference would be justifiable only if empirical
28. See, e.g., Foglia v. Novello (I), Case 104/79, [1980] E.C.R. 745, 759, 11 10-12,
[1981] 1 C.M.L.R. 45, 58.
29. See, eg., Telemarsicabruzzo SpA v. Circostel, Joined Cases 320-22/90, [1993]
E.C.R. 1-393; Monin Automobiles, [1994] E.C.R. at 1-1707.
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findings were presented to support the conclusion that Member
State courts systematically failed to comply with the obligation to
make a reference. This Author is not aware of any such findings.
On the contrary, the day-to-day practice of the Court of Justice
shows that the Member State courts are increasingly applying
Community law and no interference appears necessary.
Nonetheless, the Commission should be informed of the
cases of actual or alleged failure by courts of last instance to
make references. These cases may then be included in the Com-
mission's annual report on the application of Community law30
and be made the subject of public and parliamentary discussion.
In addition, the failure by courts to comply with the obligation
to make references under the third paragraph of Article 177
constitutes an infringement of the EC Treaty. The Commission
could initiate legal proceedings under Article 169 for failure to
fulfill EC Treaty obligations.3 ' If the Community determines
that it cannot put up with such non-compliance in the long
term, the Commission may adopt this approach.
The In Re Application of Wiinsche Handelsgesellschaf 2 ("So-
lange IT') decision of the Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal
Constitutional Court) created the possibility in Germany of over-
ruling a failure to make a reference under certain circum-
stances. Under the second sentence of Article 101(1) of the
German Basic Law,"3 the Court ofJustice has been recognized as
a "lawful judge." Thus, an individual may apply to the
Bundesverfassungsgericht on the ground that the principle of
Article 101 (1) has been infringed.
A mere procedural error, however, does not constitute an
infringement of the requirement of a "lawful judge." There
must also be the element of "arbitrariness." The failure to make
the reference must therefore, on a reasonable assessment, be in-
explicable and manifestly untenable. The obligation to refer a
matter under the third paragraph of Article 177, however, goes
further than the arbitrariness standard under the German Basic
Law. A reference under Article 177 must be made if the Court
ofJustice has not created an exception for not making the refer-
30. See, e.g., Foglia v. Novello (I), [1980] E.C.R. at 745, [1981] 1 C.M.L.R. at 45.
31. EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 169.
32. Case 2 BvR 197/83, 73 BVerfGE 339, [1987] 3 C.M.L.R. 225.
33. Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, art. 101(1) (1949) (Ger.).
"No one may be removed from the jurisdiction of his lawful judge." Id.
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ence. If the Bundesverfassungsgericht were to apply this stricter
test instead of the arbitrariness standard, the result would be a
considerable improvement in the legal protection of the individ-
ual seeking justice in Germany.
IV. PRACTICAL POINTS ON MAKING A REFERENCE FOR A
PRELIMINARY RULING
It is useful to know how a Member State court decides to
request a preliminary ruling. Because Community law contains
no special provisions, domestic procedural law applies, and
Member State courts also have a free choice as to the form of the
request. Therefore, a reference for a preliminary ruling can be
made either by judgment or by order. In many courts, the deci-
sion to refer is made by an order staying the proceedings, the
operative provisions of which contain the questions referred to
the Court. The Court does not adhere rigidly to the formulation
of these questions. If the questions do not allow for an answer,
as, for example, a question on the incompatibility of national law
with Community law, the Court of Justice will reformulate the
questions accordingly. If the Court believes that another formu-
lation of the question is appropriate, it will say so in its decision
and then provide an answer.
In order to alleviate the Court's task, the reference should
include a statement of the facts and the legal problems,
although this is not obligatory. While it is not the task of the
Court of Justice to consider the compatibility of national law
with Community law, the national court nonetheless often relies
on the assistance of the Court of Justice. The Court formulates
its answers in an abstract way, while still enabling Member State
courts to apply the answer to the facts without great difficulty. In
order to do this, the Court ofJustice needs to be acquainted with
the facts. It is therefore advisable in practice to send the case
files with the reference.
When making a decision to refer, the Member State courts
may want to know how long the reference procedure before the
Court will last. This enables the courts to predict the duration of
the interruption in the procedure. In 1993, the average dura-
tion of a preliminary ruling procedure was 20.4 months. The
duration of the interlocutory procedure is especially relevant to
the decision of whether to make a reference. A dispute that goes
1994] 399
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through the various stages of procedure to the highest courts
usually remains unresolved for several years.
A. The Procedure at the Court ofJustice Prior to the Hearing
If the national court decides to make a reference for a pre-
liminary ruling, the court sends the decision and the files to the
Court Registry. 4 The decision is translated into the official lan-
guages of the Community and then sent, in the original and in
the relevant official language, to all Member States, to the Com-
mission, to other institutions involved, if necessary, and to the
parties to the main proceedings. These groups have two months
to submit written observations,3 5 and the parties to the main pro-
ceedings may make observations in the same manner as before
the court making the reference.36 Thus, individuals may repre-
sent themselves, if national procedure does not require legal
counsel.
If the observations submitted are in other languages, they
are translated into the language of the case and into French.
There is a possibility of ten languages in each case. 37 Once the
last set of written observations has been submitted the written
procedure ends.38 In some cases, the observations will have to
be translated into the language of the case and into French
before the proceedings continue.
At this point, the judge appointed as Judge-Rapporteur
prepares the Report for the Hearing ("Report") and the prelimi-
nary report. The Report contains a concise and independent
statement of the facts and issues. The Report is sent to the par-
ticipants in the proceedings and is accessible to the public.3 9 On
the basis of the Report, the parties may determine whether the
34. There is no charge for the procedure before the Court ofJustice. Exceptions
are made for avoidable costs and for extraordinary translation costs. Costs incurred by
the Community's institutions or by Member States are not recoverable. Costs incurred
by the parties to the main proceedings are not a matter for the Court ofJustice, but are
for the Member State courts to determine in the context of the proceedings in which
the reference for the preliminary ruling originated. See Rules of Procedure of the
Court of Justice, art. 104(5), oJ. L 176/7, at 27 (1991) [hereinafter Rules of Proce-
dure].
35. Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Economic
Community, art. 20, 298 U.N.T.S. 147, 152 (1958) [hereinafter Protocol].
36. Rules of Procedure, supra note 34, art. 104(2), O.J. L 176/7, at 27 (1991).
37. Id. art. 29(1), O.J. L 176/7, at 13 (1991).
38. See Protocol, supra note 35, art. 18, 298 U.N.T.S. at 151.
39. Id. art. 18(4), 298 U.N.T.S. at 151.
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Judge-Rapporteur has fully and faithfully reproduced their argu-
ments. In appropriate cases, the parties may make observations
on that point at the hearing.
In addition, the Judge-Rapporteur prepares a preliminary
report.4" This report contains recommendations as to whether a
preparatory inquiry or any other preparatory measure should be
undertaken, and as to whether the case should be referred to a
Chamber to which the Judge-Rapporteur belongs.4 After hear-
ing the Advocate General and the recommendations of the
Judge-Rapporteur, the court decides what action to take.4 2
B. The Role of the Advocate General in the Preliminary
Reference Procedure
This is perhaps the place to say a few words about the func-
tion of the Advocate General, because this institution does not
exist in a number of Member States. In each case, the President
of the Court assigns ajudge-Rapporteur and the First Advocate
General appoints an Advocate General. Unlike the Judge-Rap-
porteur, the Advocate General does not have to make any re-
ports, but does have to express a view on the recommendations
of the Judge-Rapporteur in the preliminary report. Thus, an
opinion may be expressed as to whether a preparatory inquiry or
any other preparatory measures are necessary. In addition, the
opinion may indicate the Chamber to which the case should be
assigned. The Advocate General may, of course, fulfill this func-
tion only because he, like the Judge-Rapporteur, has a detailed
knowledge of the case.
The opinion of the Advocate General is also taken in con-
nection with other decisions of the Court of Justice where the
Rules of Procedure so provide. Like the President, the Judge-
Rapporteur, and the other Members of the Court, the Advocate
General has the opportunity at the hearing to ask questions of
the participants in the proceedings. The Advocate General's
main task, however, is to act with complete impartiality and inde-
pendence, while making, in open court, reasoned submissions
on cases brought before the Court of Justice. This assists the
Court in carrying out its duty of ensuring observance of the law
40. Rules of Procedure, supra note 34, art. 44(1), 176/7, at 16 (1991).
41. Id. art. 44(1), 1 1, 176/7, at 16 (1991).
42. Id. art. 44(1), 1 2, 176/7, at 16 (1991).
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in the interpretation and application of the EC Treaty. In prin-
ciple, once the Advocate General delivers his Opinion, his role
in the proceedings is over. He plays no part in the subsequent
deliberations of the judges. His task is analogous to that of an
individual judge charged with the preparation of the case, whose
activity comes to an end with the delivery of an advisory opinion
and who remains separate from the judges deciding the case.
C. The Oral Procedure
At the hearing, the timing of which is determined by the
judge presiding over the bench hearing the case, all the partici-
pants mentioned above may make observations, including those
who have not made observations in writing.43 For the parties to
the main proceedings, this is an opportunity to express an opin-
ion on the observations of the other participants, of which they
were not yet aware when they submitted their own observations.
While there is no limit to the scope of the written observations, a
time limit is set for the oral argument. In addition, the judges
and the Advocate General may ask the participants questions
during the oral argument.
At the close of the oral procedure, the Advocate General
reads his Opinion aloud in open court.' The operative part of
the Opinion is read at a sitting of the Court or of one of its
Chambers by the author of the Opinion or by one of his col-
leagues. The participants in the case are invited to the sitting,
but are no longer allowed to address the Court. The Opinion is
sent to the participants in the language of the case, although
also available in French and in the language used by the Advo-
cate General.
After the Opinion, the Court begins its deliberations. The
proceedings end with the delivery of the judgment in open
court. The operative part of the judgment is read out in the lan-
guage of the case. The judgment is also available in all of the
other official languages of the Community. The court making
the reference and the parties referred to in Article 20 of the Pro-
tocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice are then notified of
the judgment. In addition, the judgment is published in the Of-
43. Protocol, supra note 35, art. 20(2), 298 U.N.T.S. at 152.
44. EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 166(2).
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ficial Journal4" and in the European Court Reports.46 A short
summary appears in the "Proceedings" of the Court of Justice,
which is sent free of charge to interested persons on request.
D. Withdrawal of a Reference for a Preliminary Ruling
Once a reference for a preliminary ruling has been submit-
ted, the Court will render a judgment unless the court making
the reference withdraws it or the decision containing the refer-
ence is set aside on appeal before the national courts. The
Court will answer the question even if the higher national court
does not consider the answer to the question referred to be nec-
essary in reaching its decision.47
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE JUDGMENT IN THE PRELIMINARY
RULTNG PROCEDURE
When the Court of Justice finally delivers judgment on a
reference for a preliminary ruling, the court that made the refer-
ence and all other courts that are to rule on the same matter are
bound by the operative part of the judgment. The judgment
must be viewed in the light of the reasons set forth in its text. If
a Member State court doubts the judgment, the referring court
may make a further reference to the Court of Justice.
Moreover, the judgment constitutes a precedent, which the
Court ofJustice will follow in similar cases. If the Court declares
a Community measure invalid, the question arises whether the
declaration of invalidity is effective from the adoption of the
measure or only from the delivery of the judgment. In such
cases, the Court can, by an analogous application of the second
paragraph of Article 174 of the EC Treaty, state which of the
effects of the measure are to be regarded as continuing in
force.48
45. Instructions to the Registrar, art. 25, O.J. L 350/33, at 38 (1974).
46. Id. art. 24, OJ. L 350/33, at 38 (1974).
47. Pretore di Sal6 v. Persons Unknown, Case 14/86, [1987] E.C.R. 2545, 2568-69,
[1989] 1 C.M.L.R. 71, 91-92.
48. EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 174(2). "In the case of a regulation, however, the
Court of Justice shall, if it considers this necessary, state which of the effects of the
regulation which it has declared void shall be considered as definitive." Id.
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V. PARTICULARITIES OF THE PRELIMINARY RULING
PROCEDURE IN CONNECTION WITH PROCEEDINGS
FOR INTERIM RELIEF
A number of preliminary references have involved consider-
ation of particularities in connection with proceedings for in-
terim relief. The Queen v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte:
Factortame Ltd.49 ("Factortame 1") case, decided on 19 June 1990,
concerned provisions of the Merchant Shipping Act 1988 on the
registration of fishing vessels. The new regulations introduced
by the British statute made the entry of fishing vessels in the Brit-
ish shipping register dependent, first, upon certain nationality
requirements and, second, upon the fishing vessels being man-
aged and controlled from the United Kingdom. The intent of
the regulations was to halt the activities of Spanish companies
that had bought British fishing vessels or had their vessels newly
registered in the United Kingdom.
Those companies, whose right to fish had been removed by
the new regulations, applied to the High Court of Justice (the
"High Court") forjudicial review and for a grant of interim relief
until a decision in the main proceedings was rendered. The
High Court referred a number of questions of interpretation to
the Court ofJustice for clarification as to the compatibility of the
new British provisions with Community law. In addition, the
High Court decided, by interim order, to suspend the applica-
tion of the statute in relation to the applicants. An appeal was
made against the interim order to the Court of Appeal, which
held that, under the British Constitution, the courts had no au-
thority to refuse to apply acts of the British Parliament on a tem-
porary basis.
The dispute finally reached the House of Lords, which re-
ferred the following question to the Court of Justice:
In circumstances where, in the absence of interim measures,
the applicants will suffer irreparable damage even if a prelim-
inary ruling is ultimately made in their favor, is the national
court obliged, or at any rate empowered, under Community
law to grant interim protection of the rights claimed?
In the Factortame I decision, the Court ofJustice held that "a na-
tional court which, in a case before it concerning Community
49. Case C-213/89, [1990] E.C.R 1-2433, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 1.
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law, considers that the sole obstacle which precludes it from
granting interim relief is a rule of national law must set aside
that rule."50 The Court based that conclusion on Article 177 of
the EC Treaty,
whose effectiveness would be impaired if a national court,
having stayed proceedings pending the reply by the Court of
Justice to the question referred to it for a preliminary ruling,
were not able to grant interim relief until it delivered its judg-
ment following the reply given by the Court of Justice.
5 1
In Zuckerfabrik Siiderdithmarschen AG v. Hauptzollamt Itzehoe,52
decided on 21 February 1991, the applicants were not com-
plaining about national legal provisions, but about a Community
regulation that required them to pay a special levy to eliminate
losses that the Community had sustained in the course of a sugar
marketing year. A German Finance Court asked, noting the Foto-
Frost judgment, in which the Court of Justice had reserved for
itself the power to declare Community acts invalid, whether, in
circumstances where it had an action pending against a national
administrative measure adopted in implementation of a Com-
munity regulation whose validity was doubtful, it had the power
to suspend temporarily the enforcement of the national adminis-
trative measure, namely the determination of the levy.
On that point, the Court stated in its judgment:
In cases where national authorities are responsible for
the administrative implementation of Community regula-
tions, the legal protection guaranteed by Community law in-
cludes the right of individuals to challenge, as a preliminary
issue, the legality of such regulations before national courts
and to induce those courts to refer questions to the Court of
Justice for a preliminary ruling.
That right would be compromised if, pending delivery of
a judgment of the Court, which alone has jurisdiction to de-
clare that a Community regulation is invalid (see judgment in
Case 314/85 Foto-Frost v. Hauptzollamt Lfibeck Ost, [1987]
E.C.R. 4199, at paragraph 20), individuals were not in a posi-
tion, where certain conditions are satisfied, to obtain a deci-
sion granting suspension of enforcement which would make
50. Factortame , [1990] E.C.R. at 1-2474, 1 23, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. at 30.
51. Id. at 1-2474, 1 22, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. at 30.
52. Zuckerfabrik Sfiderdithmarschen AG v. Hauptzollamt Itzehoe, Joined Cases C-
143/88 & C-92/89, [1991] E.C.R. 1-534.
1994] 405
406 FORDHAMINTERNTATIONALLAWJOURVAL [Vol. 18:388
it possible for the effects of the disputed regulation to be ren-
dered for the time being inoperative as regards them.53
On the basis of Article 177, the Court of Justice concluded
that a national court, to which application for interim relief has
been made, may temporarily suspend the enforcement of the
national administrative measure. In coming to that conclusion,
the Court based its reasoning on two arguments.
The first relies on the need for coherence in the system of
interim legal protection.
In the context of actions for annulment, Article 185 of the
EEC Treaty enables applicants to request suspension of the
enforcement of the contested act and empowers the Court to
order such suspension. The coherence of the system of in-
terim legal protection therefore requires that national courts
should also be able to order suspension of enforcement of a
national administrative measure based on a Community regu-
lation, the legality of which is contested. 4
Although a measure of Community law was contested in the
Zuckerfabrik case, the Court, incorporating the Factortame Ijudg-
ment, unequivocally held:
The interim legal protection which Community law ensures
for individuals before national courts must remain the same,
irrespective of whether they contest the compatibility of na-
tional legal provisions with Community law or the validity of
secondary Community law, in view of the fact that the dispute
in both cases is based on Community law itself.55
The Court attached the following strict conditions to the exer-
cise of that power:
[I]nterim measures suspending enforcement of a contested
measure may be adopted only if the factual and legal circum-
stances relied on by the applicants are such as to persuade the
national court that serious doubts exist as to the validity of
the Community regulation on which the contested adminis-
trative measure is based. Only the possibility of a finding of
invalidity, a matter which is reserved to the Court, can justify
the granting of suspensory measures.5 6
53. Id. at 1-540, 1 16-17.
54. Id. at 1-541, 1 18.
55. Id at 1-541, 1 20.
56. Id. at 1-542, 1 23.
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Additionally,
suspension of enforcement must retain the character of an
interim measure. The national court to which the applica-
tion for interim relief is made may therefore grant a suspen-
sion only until such time as the Court has delivered its ruling
on the question of validity. Consequently, it is for the na-
tional court, should the question not yet have been referred
to the Court ofJustice, to refer that question itself, setting out
the reasons for which it believes that the regulation must be
held to be invalid.s '
CONCLUSION
By the end of 1993, approximately 2700 references had
been made to the Court for a preliminary ruling under Article
177 of the EC Treaty. The number of references continues to
grow regularly. Between 1961 and 1970, approximately eleven
references for preliminary rulings were made to the Court each
year. Between 1971 and 1980 that figure climbed to about 73,
and between 1981 and 1990 it climbed to approximately 130.
Over the last three years, 1991 to 1993, the yearly average has
been about 183 references.
The statistics show that the German courts take first place
with 857 references, followed by France (462), the Netherlands
(401), Italy (319), and Belgium (310). The last three years, ex-
amined separately, demonstrate a different picture. While the
German courts take first place (173 references), Italy places sec-
ond (82), followed by the Netherlands (77), France (66),
Belgium (57), and the United Kingdom (44). If one considers
the population and the number of courts in the states in ques-
tion, it is evident, first, that some of the smaller Member States,
in particular Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Belgium, con-
sult the Court very often. Second, the United Kingdom makes a
very significant contribution.
Not surprisingly, it takes time for new Member States to
make references to the Court ofJustice or for their references to
become significant in number. For example, the first reference
from a Portuguese court did not reach the Court until 1989.
More significantly, the 857 references from Germany were made
57. I& at 1-542, 1 24.
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by a total of 115 courts.5 The 319 references from Italy were
made by almost the same number of courts (108). The 310 ref-
erences from Belgium came from 65 courts.
The 462 references from France, from a total of 158 courts,
merit particular attention. Although the average number of
cases referred by each individual court is relatively low, it is note-
worthy that the courts making the references include as many as
90 first instance civil courts of various types (Tribunal
d'Instance, Tribunal de Grande Instance, and Tribunal de Com-
merce). They also include courts from overseas departments
such as the islands of Reunion and Polynesia. This fact demon-
strates strikingly the extent to which concern with Community
law permeates the entire French jurisdiction.
There are, however, states that do not use the preliminary
reference procedure as often. Portugal,5" whose courts have so
far (until the end of 1993) submitted only seven cases to the
Court ofJustice, is one example. In addition, only 28 references
from Spain6" have reached the Court of Justice to date, four of
which came from that country's highest court (Tribunal
Supremo). Although Ireland joined the Community in 1973, it
has, with 28 references, submitted fewer cases to the Court than
Greece (37), which did not join the Community until 1981. In
all, the 2688 references were made by 583 courts.
These observations demonstrate the extent to which the
preliminary ruling procedure is used, especially by the lower
courts, from which over two-thirds of the cases have come. The
willingness of the lower courts to make references may be influ-
enced by the length of the procedure, the average of which is
currently slightly more than twenty months. A court faced with
58. The term "courts" includes all references, including those made by bodies that
the Court of Justice does not regard as "courts or tribunals" within the meaning of
Article 177 (and that the Court has therefore dismissed as inadmissible). The number
of such cases, however, is not particularly large.
59. Portugal acceded to the Community in 1986. See Treaty (signed on 12 June
1985) Between the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, the French Republic, Ireland, the Italian Repub-
lic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (Member States of the European Com-
munities) and the Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic Concerning the
Accession of the Kingdom of Spain and the Portugu6se Republic to the European Eco-
nomic Community and to the European Atomic Energy Community, O.J. L 302/9
(1985) [hereinafter Accession Treaty].
60. Spain acceded to the Community in 1986. See Accession Treaty, supra note 59.
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the decision whether to hand down a judgment that correctly
applies Community law eighteen months to two years later than
one handed down, without consulting the Court, may choose
the latter alternative without infringing Community law as cur-
rently understood. Remedial measures must therefore be con-
sidered. One possibility, as has occasionally been considered,
would be to take the right to make direct references to the Court
of Justice away from lower courts and reserve that right for the
higher courts only. This modification would lead to a considera-
ble decline in the number of references. Of the 2485 references
made up to the end of 1992, 1784 were from lower courts.
Abolishing the right of lower courts to make references to
the Court of Justice, however, would not only limit the options
open to the courts of the Member States, but would also severely
curtail the opportunities for the Court of Justice to ensure that
Community law is observed. The opportunities for litigants and
their lawyers would also be diminished. The road to the Euro-
pean Court of Justice would then be open only to those parties
able and willing to exhaust all legal remedies. The incentive for
involvement in the study and practice of Community law would
also be dampened. Therefore, those responsible should con-
sider carefully whether they wish to take those ideas further.
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